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Abstract
Sellers of goods or services wishing to participate in sponsored search auctions must define
a pool of keywords that are matched on-line to the queries submitted by the users to a search
engine. Sellers must also define the value of their bid to the search engine for showing their
advertisements in case of a query-keyword match. In order to optimize its revenue a seller
might decide to substitute a keyword with a high cost, thus likely to be the object of intense
competition, with sets of related keywords that collectively have lower cost while capturing an
equivalent volume of user clicks. This technique is called keyword spreading and has recently
attracted the attention of several researchers in the area of sponsored search auctions. In this
paper we describe an experimental benchmark that through large scale realistic simulations
allows us to pin-point the potential benefits/drawbacks of keyword spreading for the players
using this technique, for those not using it, and for the search engine itself. Experimental
results reveal that keyword spreading is generally convenient (or non-damaging) to all parties
involved.
1 Introduction
A very large fraction of consumers use search engines to find information on the web about goods
and services before deciding whether to purchase them on the online markets. Search engines take
advantage of their key position on the Web to sell advertising space to economic players on search
result pages. Indeed, over the last few years, sponsored search advertising has become the dominant
source of profits for search engines. Typically sponsored search results appear in two separate parts
of the page above and to the right of the results returned by a search engine. Sponsored search
results include a title, a short text, and a link referring to a Website. Advertising space comes in
the form of slots, which are sold by auctions. When a user submits a given keyword in a query
to a search engine, an auction is run among all the advertisers submitting bids for that keyword.
The advertisers who wish to display their ads against the search for a keyword participate in the
auction by specifying their valuation and a daily budget to the search engine. The search engine
could use various mechanisms for determining winners and payments, the most popular mechanism
being the generalized second price (GSP) auction.
Although GSP looks similar to the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [20, 4, 8],
its properties are very different, i.e., truth-telling is not an equilibrium in GSP [6, 19]. Over the
last years, several papers of computational flavor have appeared, touching in different ways this
paradigm of online advertising, see, e.g., [2, 3, 6, 10, 11].
∗Institute for Advanced Studies (IMT), Lucca, Italy.
†Istituto di Informatica e Telematica (IIT-CNR), Pisa, Italy.
1
From the viewpoint of a search engine, the adword problem consists of assigning a sequence of
search keywords to a set of competing bidders, each with a daily spending limit, with the goal
of maximizing the revenue generated by these keyword sales. This problem generalizes on-line
matching, and this connection has been exploited in [13].
A central problem in adword markets from the point of view of a seller of goods and services is
the generation of keywords. Advertisers typically prefer to bid for keywords that have high search
volumes; however they may be very expensive, so that it might be reasonable to bid instead for
several related and low volume, inexpensive terms that generate roughly the same amount of traffic
altogether. Some preliminary work exploring this idea has been done in [1], where however, the
emphasis is on the algorithmic aspects of keyword generation, not on the global market phenomena
as in the present work.
In this paper we describe a large scale simulator for analyzing the effect of using synonyms
for keyword spreading, and collect a number of evidences about the effects of this strategy. Our
simulations involve up to 2M agents bidding for words from a pool of 36K words and 3M queries per
experiment (more details in Sections 2 and 3). Our experiments point to the following conclusions:
• using synonyms is generally convenient to all players in the market (Figs. 6, 7a, 7b); in
particular the agents using this strategy benefit the most (Figs. 7a, 7b)
• using a VCG payment scheme decreases the agents’ benefits with respect to using GSP (Figs.
9, 10) while not much changes for the search engine (Fig. 8)
• as the fraction of agents using synonyms increases, the search engine revenues are not signif-
icantly affected (Fig. 11) as well as the costs for the agents not using them (Fig. 12a) while
the agents using synonyms have decreasing gains (Fig. 12b)
• the budget depletion strategies are convenient for the search engine (Fig. 13)
A problem related to keyword spreading is that of keyword selection [18], where the economic
players try to select at fixed rounds the subset of keywords that maximize revenues while trying to
learn basic parameters (such as keyword click-through rates) during the repeated bidding processes.
Note that here the viewpoint is that of a single player and that the the market, as seen by the
seller, is modeled via (known or unknown) time varying probability distributions. In contrast, in
our simulations keywords are selected by the agents off-line. We simulate directly the market and
the auctions by using a large number of atomic agents each performing simple actions. Previous
research on agent-based simulation of adwords markets by Mizuta and Steiglitz [14] was centered on
studying the interaction of different classes of players according to their bidding time profiles, e.g.
early vs late bidders. Kitts and LeBlanc [9] describe a large scale simulator for adwords markets to
investigate several bidding strategies, e.g. random bidding vs. bid to keep relative position, which
however do not involve keyword spreading. To the best of our knowledge this is the first large-scale
agent-based simulation of the market effects of keyword spreading.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the clustering
technique used to build a dictionary of synonyms. In Section 3 we highlight the architecture of our
market simulator. In Section 4 we show the main outcomes of our experiments.
2 Keyword Spreading
We explore two alternative ways of performing keyword spreading. One uses the well known
Wordnet ontology, the second is based on clustering web pages related to a query as found by a
generalist search engine (in our case Google). The two resulting word distributions are different but
the measured trends are consistent for both data sets, thus giving high confidence in the robustness
of the experimental benchmark.
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Wordnet The most important project for ontologies of words is WordNet [16]. Originally pro-
posed by the Cognitive Science Laboratory at Princeton University only for the English language,
WordNet has become a reference for the whole information retrieval community, and similar projects
are now available in many other languages. WordNet is a handmade semantic lexicon that groups
words into sets of synonyms called synsets. Intuitively one can replace a word in a text with another
from the same synset without changing its semantics. A word can appear in more than one synset
if it has more than one meaning. Synsets are arranged as nodes in a graph such that there is an
edge to connect two nodes if there is a relation between the two synsets. There are different types
of possible relations, an exhaustive list of them can be found in the WordNet web site [15]. Given
two synsets X and Y, the most common types of relations in WordNet are: hypernym if every X is
a “kind of” Y, hyponym if Y is a “kind of” X, holonym if X is a part of Y and meronym if Y is a
part of X. In our experiments we took into account only hypernym.
Clustering Google Data Given a query word, our goal is to find a set of semantically related
words whose cost is lower than those of the query. We are not only interested to paradigmatic
similarity, i.e., when two words may be mutually exchanged without effects on the semantics of
the text, but also to syntagmatic similarity, i.e., when two words significantly co-occur in the same
context. To achieve this goal we approach the problem as a word clustering [5, 12] task. Given a
set of objects, clustering attempts to create a partition such that the objects in a cluster are related
among them, while objects in different clusters are unrelated.
Word clustering requires a corpus of documents related to the query word. To set up such a
corpus we redirect the query to Google and download pages related to the first 100 results. Each
page is later parsed and split to extract a set of sentences. Under the well established hypothesis
that co-related words are more likely to stand in the same sentence, all the sentences not containing
the query are discarded. We remove from each sentence over-represented words (stop words) that
are often “syntactic sugar” and their removal does not affect the semantic content of the sentence.
We added to the standard stop word list, a set of words that normally can not be considered stop
words, but in the Web environment are considered generic (e.g. “download”). Once filtered, all the
sentences are arranged in a term-document matrix whose rows correspond to sentences and whose
columns to terms of the corpus. We tested different weighting schemes for terms, and we found
that for our purpose a simple binary weighting scheme suffice.
For clustering we employed a fast implementation of the FPF clustering algorithm [7]. As distance
between pairs of words, i.e., columns of the term-document matrix, we used the well known cosine
similarity. FPF is an iterative algorithm. It makes a new cluster at each iteration and populates
it by extracting from the other clusters all the elements that are more related to the new cluster.
The procedure stops when a given number k of clusters is reached. In our case it is impossible to
predict a good value for k. Thus, instead of feeding k in advance, we make FPF check at each
iteration the number of elements in the cluster containing the query word. When this number gets
below a certain threshold (10 in our case) the algorithm stops and returns the list of the words in
the cluster containing the query. This procedure ensures that we find a coherent cluster of words
even if the query is not central in that cluster.
3 The Simulator
The starting point in designing the simulator was the collection of some publicly available data on
ad auctions:
• a reasonable set of words,
• an estimate of the cost of each word,
• an estimate of the number of clicks received by each word.
The Word List The simulator uses a finite set of words; these words represent all the possible
queries that a user can make at the search engine and also all the possible keywords an advertiser
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can bid on. The core of the word list has been taken from the SCOWL1 project (an open source
project that maintains a set of word lists for use by spell checkers), and consists of 35867 entries.
The Traffic Estimator Google has an on-line tool (the AdWords Traffic Estimator Sandbox,2)
developed to aid advertisers in their campaigns. The Traffic Estimator, given a keyword, displays
its estimated cost per click (CPC) and the estimated number of clicks per day. The simulator uses
this data to estimate some quantities that would otherwise be difficult to generate realistically.
Although, as Google itself warns, the data is to be considered only as a guideline, it is of great help
for our purposes.
The estimated CPC is used in the simulator (averaging the two values given by the Traffic Es-
timator) as a basis to assign a “real” value to each keyword. The simulator successively employs
these values as parameters to generate the agents’ bids and valuations. Clearly the estimated CPC
of a term is different from its “real” value. If we were to measure the estimated CPCs in the
simulator at the end of a run they would certainly be different from the ones supplied by the Traffic
Estimator. Nonetheless their distributions and main features would be similar, and that is enough
for the use we make of it.
The other values which are central to the simulator are the estimated number of clicks per day.
Since the simulation considers only the queries that give rise to a click, we can simply consider the
estimated number of clicks per day as the distribution of the queries in the simulator. We collected
such data for each of the 35867 entries in our dictionary, building a small database that constitutes
our initial data set. Table 1a summarizes the main characteristics of the data set.
Number of words 35867
Max. clicks per day 349216
Min. clicks per day 1
Max. CPC $23.6
Min. CPC $0.05
(a) figures from the data set
clustering Wordnet
Words with
synonyms
18660 12271
Max. syn-
onyms for a
word
13 441
Max. terms
a word is
synonym of
668 146
(b) figures from the synonyms
databases
Table 1: Main data from the word and synonym databases.
For completeness, we plotted the data collected from Google’s Traffic Estimator. Figure 1a is the
distribution of the estimated clicks per day, while Figure 1b shows how estimated average costs per
click are distributed.
We want to use our simulator to investigate the behavior of ad auction mechanism in the presence
of agents who make use of keyword spreading. To model such behaviors we need a set of synonyms
for each word. The clustering algorithms described in Section 2 produced a list of synonyms for
each word. As a reference we have also created a similar list by querying the Wordnet3 database.
Table 1b gives some basic figures on the two resulting data sets, while Figure 2a and Figure 2b show
the distribution of the number of synonyms per word and the distribution of the number of terms a
word is synonym of. There is a big difference in the boundary values of the databases: for example,
there is a term for which Wordnet gives 441 synonyms; but more important is the difference in the
rank distribution (see Fig. 2a). Due to limitations in the computational resources, the clustering
imposed a hard limit of 13 on the maximum number of synonyms per word. Nonetheless, as shown
1http://wordlist.sourceforge.net/
2https://adwords.google.com/select/TrafficEstimatorSandbox
3http://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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(a) estimated number of clicks (b) estimated CPC
Figure 1: Data gathered from Google’s Traffic Estimator, in log-log scale.
(a) number of synonyms per
word
(b) number of words a term is
a synonym of
Figure 2: Comparison of the two synonyms databases in log-scale.
clearly by Figure 2a, the majority of the words have more synonyms in the clustering database
than in the Wordnet one. Overall we can consider the databases comparable for our purposes, and
the experimentally detected trends are consistent in both databases.
Starting from a list of words, we have expanded it with various information: prices, number of
clicks and synonyms. It seems now a natural question to ask if there is any correlation between
these quantities. As a first guess it might seem reasonable to expect at least some correlation.
That is, we might expect that some “popular” words receive many clicks and have a high price. Or
that words that receive a lot of clicks also happen to have many synonyms. Somewhat surprisingly,
an empirical analysis gives a negative result. At a first glance the data set exhibits virtually no
correlation between the different values. To give a rough idea of this result we present just two
plots, all the other ones being extremely similar. Figure 3a ranks words by estimated number of
clicks, and shows these values along the CPCs (both normalized). It looks like there is no order in
the CPC values; they appear as if uniformly distributed. Figure 3b, instead, ranks the words by
the number of synonyms they possess,4 and displays this value along the estimated CPC (again,
normalized). As it seems apparent there is no correlation between these quantities. All the other
comparisons, e.g. CPCs versus click volume, synonyms versus CPC using the clustering database,
give similar results.
We are now ready to describe our simulator. The simulator has a very simple structure. It keeps
the agents and the words stored in two arrays. Each word contains a pointer to a balanced binary
4Using the Wordnet database.
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(a) nr. of clicks and CPC (log-
scale)
(b) nr. of synonyms and CPC
Figure 3: Comparison of the two synonyms databases used.
search tree5 that contains the bids on that keyword. Along the bids, each node of the tree stores a
pointer to the agent that placed that bid.
All the simulations were carried out using the same static set of agents. To this end, the set of
agents was generated once and for all and saved in a file. Its main characteristics are presented in
Table 2a. In what follows we will refer to this fixed set of agents, words and synonyms as our data
set.
Number of Agents 2 · 106
Max. bids on a
single word
21446
Min. bids on a
single word
21
Max. bids per
agent
3000
Min. bids per
agent
3
Budget Range [$1 − $100]
Bid Range [$0.01 − $200]
Nr. of slots 4
Clickthrough
probabilities
0.6, 0.25, 0.10, 0.05
(a) figures on generated agents
Keyword “reviews”
“Real” value $1.045
Estimated nr. of clicks 12029
Nr. of interested agents 11023
Max. bid $3.064
Min. bid $0.010
Max. difference vi − bi 12.5% of vi
(b) details about a sample keyword
Table 2: Figures from standard dataset.
Each agent bids on a number of different keywords. If we consider all the agents, these values are
distributed as a power law, whose parameters are based on the number of agents, such as to keep
a fixed maximum and minimum (to avoid cases in which an agent bids on all of the words, or cases
in which there are agents that have not bid on any word at all). Figure 4a plots these values for
the data set.
Another quantity characterizing agents is their budget. In this case a uniform distribution has
been chosen, and the budgets are all in the [$1 − $100] range.
5Specifically an AVL tree.
6
(a) words per agent (b) agents per word
Figure 4: Agents per word and words per agent in log-log scale.
Words Having fixed the number of words an agent will bid on, the next step is to select them from
the dictionary. The simulator does so, and the resulting values (i.e., the number of agents interested
in every word) is again distributed as a (different) power law. The parameters controlling such
distribution are chosen as to avoid unrealistic scenarios. Figure 4b shows the number of interested
agents per word in our data set.
As described above, each word is assigned a “real” value based on the data gathered from the Traf-
fic Estimator. Based on this reference value, each agent i will then compute its personal valuation
vi for the keyword. The distribution of the valuations for each agent is a normal distribution whose
mean is precisely the “real” value of the word. To increase the variety among agents, each agent
has a different variance associated to this normal distribution. Figure 5a shows the the distribution
of valuations for different agents interested in the same keyword, i.e. “reviews”.
(a) bids and valuations (b) difference valuations - bids
Figure 5: The bids and valuations for a single word, i.e. “review”, whose actual value is 1.045.
As a final step each agent i must generate a bid bi. Bids are generated according to the agent’s
valuation vi. Only bids such that bi < vi are considered, and they are generated so that the
differences vi − bi are distributed according to a power law. Figure 5b shows the resulting plot for
the keyword “reviews”. Except for the maximum number of interested agents per word, all the
other characteristics described are parameters to the simulator. The number of interested agent
per word is indirectly controlled by setting the maximum and minimum number of words a single
agent can bid on.
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4 Experimental Results
Fig. 6 shows the increment in search engine revenue between a basic simulation (in which no agent
ever changes keywords) and one where we allow 20% of the agents to apply keyword spreading,
using both the Wordnet database and our clustering techniques. The difference levels-off with a
gain of 0.5 to 0.8 of a point. Given the total value of the adwords market this difference is very
significant in absolute terms.
Figure 6: Comparison of the search engine’s revenue when we allow some agents to change their
keywords with synonyms provided by Wordnet and by the clustering technique.
In Fig. 7a we show the increase in revenue for the agents that are allowed to change words (20%
of total), and in Fig. 7b for those that are not allowed (80% of total). For both groups the increase
in revenue is positive and levels-off, with the agents in the fist group having better performance (in
the range 3.2%-5.3%).
(a) keyword spreading agents (b) non keyword spreading
agents
Figure 7: Increase in revenue for agents.
The simulations in figures 6,7a and 7b were all run under the GSP mechanism.
Figures 8, 9 and 10 report the results of experiments to test the impact of VCG and GSP policies
in the revenue increment of the search engine (8), of the agents performing keyword spreading (9)
and of those not using this policy (10). We note that the impact of the two policies is quite relevant
for the single agents, with GSP yielding an increment more than double than that of VCG. In
contrast for search engines the difference in increment is about 0.1%.
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(a) Wordnet (b) clustering
Figure 8: Increase in revenue for the search engine under VCG and GSP pricing policies
(a) Wordnet (b) clustering
Figure 9: Increase in revenue for agents using keyword spreading under VCG and GSP pricing
policies
(a) Wordnet (b) clustering
Figure 10: Increase in revenue for agents not using keyword spreading under VCG and GSP pricing
policies
Figures 11, 12a, 12b show the variation in revenue increase when we vary the fraction of users using
keyword spreading from 5% to 95% of the total. While the increased revenue for the search engine
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and for non-keyword spreading agents is hardly affected, we notice a clear effect of diminishing
marginal gain for keyword-sprading agents, with initial gains up to 8% for early adopters, and just
2% when the practice in widespread.
Figure 11: Search engine’s increase in revenue for varying fraction of keyword spreading agents.
(a) non keyword-spreading
agents
(b) keyword-spreading agents
Figure 12: Agent’s increase in revenue for varying fraction of keyword spreading agents.
We also explore the effect of a class of strategic behavior called budget depletion strategies. Here
for 20% of the words the last bidder of each word that obtains an advertisement slot will switch
to a policy of increasing its bid so to deplete the competition’s budget faster, without incurring in
any additional cost. We explore two cases (a) called “unrealistic” where the strategic agent knows
the optimal new bid value, and (b) called “realistic” where the optimal new bid value is sought by
small successive increments. Figure 13 shows the percentage change in the search engine’s revenue,
when budget depletion strategies are used.
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